I. The Opinion of OthersHenry of Ghent. ¹⁹

52. On this question it is said that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, presupposed to generation, as matter, - and something introduced by generation, as form, - and something from these the product, which is generated, so proportionally in divine reality there correspond as it were three similar things; the person to be sure is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasimatter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasimatter.

53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine Against Maximinus, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: “but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance”]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, whether negatively, as when someone says he is speaking ‘of nothing’ when he is not speaking, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ so as to make it a mark of materiality or quasimateriality, because nothing cannot be the matter of anything, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ by way of origin or order, that is in the sense of after nothing. Which three ways of understanding ‘something is from nothing’ are put down by Anselm Monologion ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than the substance of the Father, then plainly he is from the substance of the Father.

54. And if one respond as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, - the argument is that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the ‘from’ as it indicates the idea of originating or efficient principle; and once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), therefore from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.

55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is ‘born Wisdom’.

56. If one argue against this opinion [n.52] that ‘pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because it is in no way in potency’, and further, by the reason of the Master, ‘since there is one essence of three persons, the Son is generated from the essence of the three’, - the response to the first is by saying thatScotus here proceeds to quote Henry of Ghent, Summa a.54 q.3 arg.7 of the third principle and response to arg.3. ²⁰ “something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of the thing or the idea; in another way something is in potency to something which is a respect only, and it differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing really from it, and it passes from potency to act by a real transmutation in the matter, - and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something different in intention from it, and it passes from potency to act by change of idea; in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and it is about potency in this sense that the middle term in the argument is true, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. Things are not like this of potency in the second way, because it is from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act; it is also the case that - in the second way - it is in potency to several respects.”

57. “Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs specifically from the natural production which is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject - which is in potency ‘in a certain respect’ - is something existing in act; but it differs in this respect that the subject in the case of alteration is in potency to something absolute, really differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, - and in this regard divine production agrees more with the production of the species from the genus (but it differs), because in the case of this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but in divine production the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it only in idea; and so, although the production of the species from the genus is more like divine production than any other one is, yet it differs in many respects, because the production of the species from the genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, taking up the determination of the complement through the difference, so that according to this and that really different thing it descend to this and that different species and is in idea only one common thing. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, determined by the assumption of a property, but one and the same singular being has being totally - through production - in diverse relative properties, which is something common not in idea but in communication.”

58. To the second [n.56] it is said that the Son is not from the substance insofar as it is the substance of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.

59. To this opinion [n.52] there is added by others [following Henry] that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subjected to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion through this argument: ‘what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved’. He takes ‘what is moved’ for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while it is motion it is not the term. But if he were to take ‘what is generated’ for the term of generation, not for the subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore he must be taking ‘what is generated’ there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, at the same place, com.8-9.

60. For this opinion these sort of reasons are adduced:

That is said to be truly subjectively generated, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.

61. A confirmation of the reason is that transmutation and the term are in the same thing as the disposition and the form to which the disposition disposes; therefore since in the essence there is relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, there will be in it generation itself.

62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the fecundity of the quasi-active Father there will correspond some quasipassive power, from which it can produce.

63. Finally there is an argument like this: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So it is in the proposed case, the essence of the Father - from which the Father generates -will be the quasi-matter with respect to generation.

64. [Rejection of the opinion] - I argue against this opinion [n.52].

First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter.

Proof of the antecedent:

65. John 10.29: “What the Father gave me is greater than all things;” something ‘greater than all things’ is only something infinite; this is only essence, - so he gave essence.

66. This is also the intention of Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: “Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so procession from both also bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without beginning.” But it is not conceded that any form was given or communicated by production or bestowed by generation unless the communicated form is the formal term of the production.

67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]:

First, because no formally univocal entity, being simply more perfect than the formal term, is attained through production; the essence is formally infinite, the relation is not; therefore if the relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have the essence by production.

68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, - as is plain in Physics 2.1.193b12-13, where it is held that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is “the way to nature” [n.28].Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is also proved because otherwise this generation would not be univocal, because the formal idea of its term would not be the idea of the agreement of the generator with the generated; the consequent is discordant, as will be touched on in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.43].” ²¹

69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in a genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b6-8, - as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because quality is there the form which is the formal term of alteration;     therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.

70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]:

First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, - and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc     .

71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence in only one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes - as formal term of production and, along with this, as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is that, if by force of production, it had essence as formal term, it would have it when everything else is removed; therefore it would not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have essence in any way such that, with that way removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. The consequence also seems to be that it would have essence twice, and it would naturally have it before it has it, if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.

72. Again, second to the principal [n.52]:Text cancelled by Scotus: “Let the reason that is put fifth below be the second, and let the third be third, and let what is here second be the fourth, and let what is fourth be fifth.” Hence the paragraphs would have had to be renumbered thus: 64(71), 80(82), 76(79), 83(85), 72(75). ²² to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being - in whatever genus of principle - does not belong to anything save to a real being.

73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son by impression is generated; either it is precisely being for itself, which is of essence as essence, - and then the Son is from the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or being in some subsistence belongs to it. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, - and if so, since in the understanding of that which is ‘being from which something is produced’ there is included that which is ‘being that in which form is introduced’, and in the understanding of that which is ‘being in which’ is included ‘having that which is in it’ and consequently ‘being formally through it’, -therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that essence as it is in the Father will be that in which generated knowledge is imprinted, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or generated knowledge knowing, which is discordant [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and in some way precedes, ‘insofar as it is that from which’, the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is discordant.

74. If essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ has no existence in a person, just as matter too ‘insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated’ does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in the supposit to be generated, - this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, there must be attributed some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is principle of the composite, although there does not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participating it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which naturally is before it is part of the composite. So here, then, there must be given to the essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ either being in a supposit or the being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].

75 If it be said in another way that ‘insofar as it is of the Father’ it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation, namely insofar as generated knowledge is actually formed, it is actually of another supposit, - this has been rejected in the argument, because in the understanding of that which is ‘to be from which’ by impression there is included ‘to be in which’, and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed; likewise, in that case the communication of essence to another supposit would, in understanding, precede the production, such that the communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, - just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to its term; likewise, although something which is from itself not of some supposit in act may come by generation to be actually of some supposit, - just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, - yet that that which is of one supposit should come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter seems impossible without any action which is directed to the matter.

76. Further, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of the active to the passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.

77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, - and it is plain from the example of heating fire and heatable wood and generated heat.

78. Again, these respects, namely of the active to the passive and of the active to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active element, - and the respect to the product is not prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, - because the active acts on the passive by itself alone by reason of cause; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny that necessarily the respect of the active to the passive is not posterior to the respect of each to the product.

79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and some quasi-matter that come together for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasimatter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since the thing does not naturally prerequire - nor does it necessarily require at the same time - that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that the naturally pre-required relation of the quasi-active element to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in himself, prior to his relation to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems discordant.

80. Again, fourth: the first power that is effectively causative causes by itself alone, excluding every other cause - both of the same genus and of a different genus - in idea of material cause.

81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which something does not include imperfection, - to wit to something first in the genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power per se, without any material principle as the ‘in which’, produces the product.

82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without any quasi-matter; for the reason seems similar about the productive and causative principle, that if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not be - insofar as it is such -of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to be needing to be reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.

83. Again, fifth, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.14 says: “the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but he is thence whence he proceeds;” so Augustine concedes, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not from nothing but from the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father.

84. And this is proved by reason, that in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him according to that opinion - as it seems -, because it posits that the Word is generated by impression on that from which it is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exhalation of itself, from the formed will from which it is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some ‘from which’ does not have that ‘from which’ as the matter in its production, because all matter - of the production and of the product - is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. The Holy Spirit therefore is not from nothing, nor yet from the quasi-matter of its production.

85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, - the essence as ‘that from which the Son is generated’ should not be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].

86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry’s opinion, n.52]:

That the Son is from the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation, as to the real existence of generation; but for that existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter;     therefore etc     .

87. The major is plain from Augustine Against Maximinus [ibid.]: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father [n.50].” The minor is plain, - no being of reason is precisely, necessarily required for this generation as it is existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the activity of our intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.

88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore it is in no respect quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.

89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same thing in generator and generated is not proper to matter; nay rather the soul [sc. which is form of the body] is the same in the heart generating as in a part generated [n.135], - matter never, in the case of the creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by the single form; in propagation, the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the propagator; there is a deception here in the remark [from Henry] ‘because there is the same matter of the thing corrupted and the thing generated’ - as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.

90. Again, things simply incompossible cannot be the act of something simply the same; however the ‘same’ can well be the act of incompossibles, as the soul is of the organic parts [n.133].

91. Again, the composite is constituted by the fact that the potential is actuated and determined by the act of the composite; therefore the essence will be referred and determined [sc. to and by something else]. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save as the thing actuated is qualified, so the relation of anything is not actuated save as it is referred [to something]. Essence is not referred [to something].

92. Again, another reason - which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] - that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. - An instance [of Henry against this]: ‘the Father is like the Son in deity’. However, this relation is not the act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry].